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Experiments in Ethics? 
Kant on Chemistry and Practical Philosophy 
 
 
 
I discuss two puzzling and neglected passages in the Critique of Practical Reason, namely, V:92 and 
V:163. In these passages Kant claims that practical philosophers should follow the paradigm of the 
chemist and conduct experiments on common human reason. I explain Kant’s conception of the 
chemical experiment, provide a detailed interpretation of the two passages in question, and conclude 
by applying the structure of the chemical experiment to the Analytic of the Critique of Practical 
Reason. Chemical experiments as a model of ethics should be understood as a method of confirming 
that a philosophical theory systematizes and defends ideas that ordinary rational agents are already 
committed to.  
 
 
  
  
In two passages of the Second Critique, Kant recommends chemical experiments as a 
paradigm for practical philosophy. Owen Ware recently remarked that this recommendation 
is “at once odd and intriguing”.1 The significance of the two passages for Kant’s practical 
philosophy is frequently overlooked in the Kant literature2, presumably since it is prima facie 
difficult to understand why Kant thinks that the ethicist can learn anything for her enterprise 
from the chemist. After all, chemical science is empirical and descriptive, whereas practical 
philosophy is supposed to be a priori and normative. There has, however, recently been a 
surge of interest in the question of how the sciences influence Kant’s ethics3, as well as in the 
role of our ordinary, pre-philosophical conception of morality – the object which the 
chemical method in ethics is supposed to scrutinize.4 This makes Kant’s odd and intriguing 
recommendation worth a closer look. 
In this paper, I will discuss the fruitfulness but also the limits of the experiment as a method 
for Kant. The contribution of my paper to Kant scholarship is to show how Kant in the 
Second Critique stresses that his philosophy has moral convictions and important experiences 
of the non-philosopher on its side, and how thought experiments can confirm elements of 
Kant’s theory. Kant believes that his philosophy is different from theoretically sophisticated, 
yet “alien and irrelevant considerations” (IV:404.27-8) 5, and “perplexing speculations of the 
schools” (V:35.16-18), which can deflect ordinary judgements from the straight course. 
Unlike these other approaches to morality, it is possible to link the results of his practical 
philosophy back to a conception of the good that precedes all academic sophistication. Kant 
advocates experiments as a method of inquiry into “every human being’s practical reason” 
(V:92.28-9), “reason judging morally” (ibid.163.16), and “common human understanding” 
(ibid.20). Experiments are supposed to facilitate this enquiry by creating a context in which 
underlying structures of ordinary reasoning are revealed clearly and in isolation of 
  
obstructing factors. The chemical method is an element that Kant believes is distinctive of his 
approach and sets his philosophy apart from those of his colleagues.  
Both chemistry passages deserve to be quoted in full here: 
 
P1: “[The philosopher] has, however, the advantage that, almost like a chemist, he can at any time 
set up an experiment with every human being’s practical reason in order to distinguish the moral 
(pure) determining ground from the empirical affected will (e.g., that of someone who would 
gladly lie because he can gain something by it). When an analyst adds alkali to a solution of 
calcareous earth in hydrochloric acid, the hydrochloric acid at once releases the lime and unites 
with the alkali, and the lime is precipitated. In just the same way, if a man who is otherwise honest 
(or who just this once puts himself only in thought in the place of an honest man) is confronted 
with the moral law in which he cognizes the worthlessness of a liar, his practical reason (in its 
judgement of what we ought to do) at once abandons the advantage, unites with what maintains in 
him respect for his own person (truthfulness), and the advantage, after it has been separated and 
washed from every particle of reason (which is entirely on the side of duty), is weighed by 
everyone, so that it can enter into combination with reason in other cases, only not where it could 
be opposed to the moral law, which reason never abandons but unites with most intimately.” 
(V:92.27-93.10) 
 
P2: “We have at hand examples of reason judging morally. We can analyse them into their 
elementary concepts and, in default of mathematics, adopt a procedure similar to that of chemistry 
– the decomposition, by repeated experiments on common human understanding, of the empirical 
from the rational that might be found in them – and come to know both of them pure and what 
each can accomplish of itself; and in this way we can prevent on the one hand the errors of a still 
crude, unpracticed appraisal and on the other hand (what is far more necessary) the leaps of genius 
by which, as happens with the adepts of the philosopher’s stone, without any methodological study 
or knowledge of nature’s visionary treasures are promised and true ones are thrown away.” 
(V:163.15-26)6 
 
Kant’s proposal to think of chemical experiments as a paradigm for ethics raises, at least, four 
questions, with which I will deal in this paper. Firstly, what is it about chemical experiments 
that Kant deems characteristic of this method and that should inspire the ethicist? The first 
section of my paper will therefore explain Kant’s conception of the chemical experiment. 
  
Secondly, how does the chemical experiment translate to ethics? In the second section, I will 
show how Kant’s idealized example of an experiment in P1 is supposed to reveal the nature 
of the relation between the will of finite rational beings, happiness and rational incentives. 
Thirdly, what is the function of experiments for Kant’s ethics? P1 leaves open the status of 
the experiment. It is not clear whether Kant takes experiments to be a method of practical 
philosophy, or a means of moral education. In the third section, I will show that P2 reveals 
that experiments are intended by Kant as a method of confirming elements of his practical 
philosophy. Nonetheless, they have an indirect function for education insofar as practical 
philosophy must be the basis of moral education, and insofar as experiments can also be used 
to demonstrate or illustrate.7 Fourthly, how does the experiment advance our understanding 
of Kant’s engagement with common human reason? In the final section of my paper, I will 
apply the experimental framework to the Analytic of the Second Critique, the part of Kant’s 
work in which the chemical method is most prevalent. Setting up and analyzing thought 
experiments is supposed to provide a confirmation that Kant’s philosophical enquiry has our 
ordinary understanding of morality on its side.  
 
1. Kant’s conception of chemical experiments 
The aim of this section is to provide an overview of how a chemical experiment, according to 
Kant, proceeds. I will not offer a new interpretation of Kant’s conception of chemistry but 
merely highlight elements that are recognized in the existing literature but not understood in 
its relevance for Kant’s practical philosophy. My investigation in this section will enable us 
in the next section to properly understand Kant’s dense discussion of a thought experiment 
modelled on a chemical paradigm, and to understand the role of what I will call “laws of 
practical affinity”.  
  
That Kant, of all possible sciences, draws on chemistry is hardly surprising given the 
intellectual Zeitgeist of the late 18th century. Much could be said here about the influence of 
chemistry on the intellectual life of Enlightenment, Romanticism and Classical German 
Philosophy.8 However, in what follows, I will focus my investigation on the role of the 
experiment for Kant’s practical philosophy.  
Kant was “deeply engaged with the science of his time”9, and we can assume that he was 
familiar with state of the art chemistry.10 Chemistry, for Kant, is distinguished from a priori 
science by its laws which are “merely laws of experience” [Erfahrungsgesetze] (IV:468.25, 
see also XX:259.4-10). Chemistry is a posteriori (IV:469.11, XXIX:97.12-17), and, at 
bottom, “arbitrary” (IV:469.10). In his late Metaphysics of Morals, Kant, however, indicates 
that chemistry is a rational science (VI:207.7-14). Finally, In his Opus Postumum, Kant states 
that chemistry is part of physics (XXI:288.5-6, 316.20-22), which has a priori foundations 
(XXI:527.18-528.18). I will, in this paper, focus on Kant’s conception of chemistry at the 
time of writing the Second Critique.11 In the 1780th, Kant stresses repeatedly that a priori laws 
for chemistry cannot be found (IV:471.4-5), and that chemistry is thus a “systematic art or 
doctrine of experiments” [Experimentallehre] (IV:471.5-6, see also IV:468.29). Experiments 
are a form of enquiry particularly suited to chemistry. An a priori science such as physics, by 
contrast, though it admits of experiments (see for instance B:xii-xiii), does not need 
experiments to establish its most general principles (B:xix.fn.). These principles can be 
established a priori. Chemistry, Kant believes, lacks an a priori part, its first principles lack 
necessity and they are based on experience (IV:468.17-29). Chemical experiments are a 
method of a posteriori investigation and the only means to warrant chemical principles.  
According to Kant, a chemist is both a “Scheide Künstler” and a “Mengmeister” 
(XXIX:117.24-5), i.e., an artist of separation [Scheide Künstler] and an expert of 
combination or blending [Mengmeister]. This has a rationale in the nature of chemical forces 
  
themselves, since they include repulsion or decomposition [Scheiden] and attraction or 
composition [Zusammensetzen] (XXIX:117.18). A chemical experiment, for Kant, consists 
of the decomposing of a substance, keeping the components of the substance in isolation, and 
then recombining components with another substance.12 We will now look at this process in 
more detail: 
 
Step 1 Decomposition: According to the Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science, 
chemistry uses “forces of repulsion and attraction” (ibid.26) as its basic explanatory terms.13 
In a chemical “decomposition” [Scheidung] (IV:530.17) two substances composing a solution 
are “separated” (IV:530.16) from each other. A decomposition can be initiated when the 
chemist adds another, third, substance to a solution of two substances. This reaction breaks 
the solution into its components.14 In the next section, we will see that P1 describes such a 
decomposition of two substances initiated by a third substance. “Decomposition” is what 
philosophers would call an “analysis”: a process of breaking a larger whole into its (basic) 
parts in order to gain understanding of the whole by investigation of its components in 
isolation of each other. 
 
Step 2 Recombination: The second step consists of two sub-steps. The first is to keep the 
decomposed components in isolation and to “carefully avoid mixing them together with 
others with which they are usually connected in their use” (A/B:842/870). This is done in 
order to be able to “securely determine” (A/B:842/870) the specific influence and 
contribution of each part to the whole. The second sub-step is discussed in a footnote in the 
First Critique (B:XXI). Chemistry and metaphysics share a procedure which Kant calls 
“synthetic” (ibid.). He illustrates this procedure as follows: When the metaphysician has 
decomposed pure cognition into its elements, appearances and things in themselves, 
  
“dialectic once again combines them, in unison with the necessary rational idea of the 
unconditioned, and finds that the unison will never come about except through that 
distinction” (ibid.). The metaphysician who practices dialectic not only recombines the 
elements of pure cognition after their decomposition, but also introduces a third element (the 
idea of the unconditioned). This is done with the intention of gaining new metaphysical 
insight, pertaining to the ultimate (unconditional) structure of reality. It is one of Kant’s aims 
in the First Critique to warn that such a method, if the unconditioned is not treated as a 
merely regulative principle, can give rise to illusions and misconceptions.15 While Kant is 
critical of the method of the (dogmatic) metaphysician he seems to think that the 
recombination with a third substance is a legitimate method for chemistry: The chemist 
observes the components reacting in specific ways with other components, and thus gains 
knowledge about the components’ affinities or their behaviour with other components.  
 
The reason why Kant thinks that chemists can gain knowledge by recombination is that 
components do not combine arbitrarily, but according to their affinities. Affinities are elective 
attractions of substances and determine the outcome of chemical reactions. In the 
Anthropology an affinity is characterised as the  
 
“interaction of two specifically different, physical substances, which intimately act upon each 
other and strive for unity, and this unification effects something third that has properties, which 
can only be produced by the unification of two heterogeneous substances” (VII:177.20-4).  
 
The theory of affinities dates back to Newton who postulated short-range forces of attraction 
and repulsion for a microscopic level in analogy to the force of gravity. Whereas gravity is 
determined only by the mass of substances, the short-range forces are also sensitive to the 
quality of substances, in the sense that certain substances have affinities to certain other 
  
substances.16 In the mid and late 18th century chemists devised tables of affinities: Listings of 
the affinities of a substance to other substances under different conditions, such as 
temperature, and the various medium substances of the chemical reaction.17 The existence of 
affinities revealed that the combination of even the smallest components of nature is 
governed by laws.18 Studying elective affinities meant employing the experimental method of 
decomposing a substance, keeping its components isolated, and observing their 
recombination with other components according to laws of nature.19  
 
2. Conducting experiments with everyone’s practical reason 
We will now put Kant’s framework of decomposition and recombination to work in order to 
understand P1, and to investigate what Kant’s proposed experiment, as well as the differences 
between ethical and chemical experiments reveal about reasoning in particular cases. This 
will help us understand in the last section of the paper how Kant in the Second Critique’s 
Analytic uses thought experiments to confirm his distinction between two different 
determining grounds of the will (see section 4.1), and the practical affinities of this will, or 
the unconditional normative status of practical laws (see section 4.2). We will discuss P1 in 
two steps. We will first discuss the decomposition and recombination (2.1) and then what it 
means that an agent is confronted with the moral law (2.2). 
 
2.1 Decomposition and Recombination 
We can see the chemical process of decomposition and recombination at work in P1: “an 
analyst [Scheidekünstler] adds alkali to a solution of calcareous earth in hydrochloric acid, 
the hydrochloric acid at once releases the lime and unites with the alkali, and the lime is 
precipitated” (V:92.33-5). Philosophers can apply the experimental method “[i]n just the 
same way” [Ebenso] (V:92.35) in philosophy. “In just the same way” means that there are 
  
structural similarities between the doings of the chemist and the philosopher. It certainly does 
not mean that chemist and practical philosopher are dealing with the same objects or operate 
with the same notion and standard of evidence. After all, Kant stresses that the philosopher is 
only supposed to set up experiments “almost” [beinah] (V:92.27) like a chemist, not follow a 
chemical method literally.  
The philosophical experiment is meant to facilitate an investigation of different elements 
involved in rational deliberation by distinguishing “the moral (pure) determining ground from 
the empirical affected will” (V:92.29-31). The analogue of the hydrochloric acid, the 
substance that in the chemical experiment releases a substance and unites with another 
substance, is practical reason, or the will of the “honest man (or who just this once puts 
himself only in thought in the place of an honest man)” (V:92.36-7). Both hydroclorid acid 
and the honest man’s will begin the experiment in a solution with another substance. The will 
is, at the beginning of the experiment, “empirically affected” (V:92.30-1), that is to say, 
affected with the desire to lie. The honest man is the agent who, in principle, recognises the 
moral law and is capable of abstracting from empirical determining grounds in his 
judgements, but is also incentivised to violate moral commands. In the philosophical 
experiment, the solution of will and empirical determining ground, a solution that can be 
called “an empirically determined or impure will”, is “confronted with the moral law” 
(V:92.37-93.1). The moral law is a pure determining ground and analogous to the alkali. In 
the chemical experiment the alkali is added by the chemist, in the philosophical experiment 
the philosopher confronts the honest man with the moral law. The honest man’s will 
abandons empirical determining grounds, both components of the solution are being 
separated from each other (decomposition), and the will “unites with what maintains in [the 
honest man] respect for his own person” (V:93.3-4), i.e., with pure determining grounds 
  
(recombination) – a change that is structurally equivalent to the one the hydroclorid acid 
undergoes. 
A note about translation is in order to properly understand the analogy. The way Gregor 
translates the analogue of the empirical determining ground, “Kalkerde” as “calcareous earth” 
and “Kalk” as “lime”, unfortunately makes P1 unnecessarily difficult to understand.20 
Gregor’s “calcareous earth” and “lime” suggest that four substances (hydrochloric acid, 
alkali, calcareous earth, and lime) are involved in P1. In the previous section I, however, 
argued that the best way to understand Kant’s notion of a chemical experiment is that a third 
substance is added to a solution of two other substances and this third substance initiates a 
decomposition and recombination. It is not clear what a separate fourth substance would do 
in this process. In addition, the German suggests that calcareous earth (Kalkerde) and lime 
(Kalk) are not different substances. Both are “Kalk”. The one, calcareous earth (Kalkerde), is 
lime in a solution with another substance, namely hydrochloric acid, the other, lime (Kalk), is 
the product of a chemical reaction that separates lime from the hydrochloric acid.21 It is 
clearer in the German than in the English translation that P1 works on a model devised for 
three substances (hydrochloric acid, alkali, Kalk).  
When confronted with moral commands, reason “abandons” (V:93.2) empirical determining 
grounds, and empirical determining grounds are separated of “every particle of reason” 
(V:93.5). That empirical determining grounds are separated from reason as the result of a 
process indicates that prior to this separation they had reason on their side, or that satisfying 
one’s sensuous needs and inclinations can be rational, as long as it is morally permissible. 
Otherwise no separation would be required. After the separation, however, acting on 
empirical determining grounds is no longer rational, since reason is “now entirely on the side 
of duty” (V:93.6). It might still be prudent but there is nothing that can rationally be said for 
it. 
  
A note about edition is in order here. Jens Timmermann and Valerio Rohden propose to 
emend the Academy Edition’s “nur gänzlich auf Seite der Pflicht ist” (V:93.6).22 They 
suggest reading the “nur” (only) as “nun” (now). The former would mean that duty is the only 
(“nur”) rational option, and pursuit of happiness is never rational, whereas the latter expresses 
the much more moderate claim that in a morally relevant situation duty is now (“nun”) the 
only rational option.23 I agree with this emendation. It would be very odd for Kant to 
completely dismiss that pursuing happiness can be rational. After all, the experiment 
explicitly started with reason being in a solution with empirical incentives.  
Whilst Kant’s conception of happiness is not the main focus of this paper, it is one of the 
interesting aspects of his discussion of chemistry that Kant here discusses the rationality of 
the pursuit of personal happiness. On the most plausible reading of P1 pursuing personal 
happiness is the default starting position of rational deliberation and rational to do, unless 
morality issues a veto and then (but only then) all rationality is on the side of this veto. The 
empirical option that is now without reason, however, might still be appealing to an agent’s 
sensuous side and can even move this agent to act against rational commands. We will see 
below (sec.4.2) that Kant’s prime example of a thought experiment explicitly accommodates 
irrationality or the fact that there is an important difference between judging correctly in an 
idealized and hypothetical scenario and actions in the real world. Rational affinities do not 
necessarily lead to de facto priorization of morality. The gallows case will show how agents 
can react to the obstruction of the messiness of real life cases, and how the affinities of their 
will shine through in their judgements.  
 
2.2 Confronting an Agent with the Moral Law 
What does it mean that in the experiment an empirically affected will abandons empirical 
determining grounds once an agent is “confronted with the moral law”? On the most 
  
straightforward reading “confronted” simply means that the agent becomes aware of a moral 
prohibition – either as a result of critical reflection on her intended action or because 
someone else, in the example the chemist, points out that her action requires moral scrutiny 
and what the morally questionable aspects of the action are. In some cases, however, simply 
reflecting on one’s intended action or a reminder by other people of what duty commands 
might not be sufficient to change one’s mind. Being confronted with the moral law can 
presumably also occur as the result of a longer lasting dialogue in which the intentions or 
goals of an agent are critically scrutinized, their moral implications explained to the agent and 
in which the agent is presented with exemplary cases in order to trigger the right intuitions.24 
This interpretation of what it means to be confronted with the moral law resonates well with 
the notion that an experiment is, unlike a mere observation, an artificial scenario that is 
created and controlled by the scientist in order to necessitate nature to answer our questions 
(see B:XIII, A/B:645-6/673-4). The scientist plays an active role in setting up a specific 
experiment, just as the ethicist is active when trying to bring an agent to understand certain 
moral propositions, or morally relevant features that must be taken into account.25 
The experiment rests on the assumption that once moral commands are sufficiently clear or 
made clear to an agent, they will have an effect on his appraisal of morally relevant 
situations, even when this agent is empirically affected.26 This interpretation of the 
experiment for ethics accords well with the phenomenon that it is not always clear for agents 
what they ought to do, and that agents sometimes need other agents to remind them to reflect 
on their actions and to set them right. In this sense Kant’s philosophical operation is 
disanalogous to the chemical experiment in the neat way it is described in P1. A chemical 
analogue to confronting a stubborn agent with the moral law would rather be an experiment 
in which the chemist is unsure of how to decompose a substance, and in which he has to try 
  
out various instruments, tools and strategies in his “fight” with the recalcitrant substance, 
until he finally discovers how to decompose it.  
The question of how to interpret the “confronted with the moral law” also reveals a more 
important difference between the chemical experiment and its analogue in practical 
philosophy: Moral considerations are not consciously present within every deliberation of an 
agent and to facilitate the ethical experiment an agent’s awareness is drawn to morally salient 
features. Even if explicit moral considerations are introduced by another agent who draws 
attention to the morally relevant features of an action, they are never added to the solution of 
will and empirical determining grounds as a chemical substance is added to a solution. For 
Kant, moral constraints are always part of a rational agent’s will. While the chemist adds an 
entirely new substance that was previously not contained within a solution, the philosophical 
experimenter only has to bring to an agent’s attention something that is always, implicitly, 
present in her will (though not always active in the sense that it determines the will). In so far 
as no external substance is added to the solution, the chemical method fails to capture Kant’s 
conception of deliberation in morally relevant scenarios. Marginalizing this difference would 
suggest that the moral law is external and heteronomous.27  
 
I summarize: The philosophical experiment in P1 contains a dense illustration of Kant’s 
conception of finite agents’ moral deliberation. The experiment captures well Kant’s 
trichotomy between will, pure and empirical determining grounds, as well as the stronger 
affinities between will and pure determining grounds. Furthermore, it shows that Kant thinks 
of the one who conducts the experiment as active, or as creating concrete fictional scenarios. 
The main difference between experiments in chemistry and ethics is that in ethics the 
experimenter needs to raise attention to something that is already there, whereas in chemistry 
something entirely new is added. In chemistry and philosophy experiments are highly 
  
artificial and controlled situations explicitly created to isolate the structure under 
investigation from interfering factors. How can such an artificial scenario reveal anything 
about real life deliberation and the empirical context in which it starts, though? We will find 
an answer to this when we look at the gallows case, Kant’s prime example of an ethical 
experiment (sec.4.2). Before that we must turn to the question of what the general purpose of 
the experiment is, or what activity it is exactly supposed to facilitate. 
 
3. Means of Education or Method of Philosophy? 
Experiments in the sciences are supposed to confirm elements of scientific theories. Their 
goal is to gain knowledge. Matters are not as clear cut in ethics, since for Kant the purpose of 
ethics, besides gaining knowledge about morality, is to morally improve agents. This is 
reflected in an important ambivalence in the description of the experiment in P1. It is not 
clear who or what the analogue of the chemist is. Does Kant recommend the method of 
chemistry as a means of education, i.e., in order to improve agents according to the teachings 
of a philosophical doctrine, or as a method of practical philosophy for establishing the 
doctrine in the first place?  
It is noteworthy that Kant, at the end of P1, uses the language of purification. Empirical 
incentives are “washed from every particle of reason” (V:93.6) or the will is purged and 
cleansed by reason from empirical determining grounds. This suggests that the ethical 
experiment is supposed to facilitate the cleansing of the will from impurities, and that it 
serves the purpose of improving a person’s moral disposition. Furthermore, though Kant 
mentions the philosopher only a few lines before he introduces the experiment (V:92.24), 
when he specifies what the analogue of the chemist is supposed to do, he uses an imperative 
construction, which can be best translated as: “At the same time confront him, who is 
otherwise an honest man […], with the moral law” (V:92.35-93.1).28 Using an imperative in 
  
an academic work is unusual, and if Kant thought that it was the philosopher who was 
supposed to conduct the experiment, a simple “he” instead of an imperative would have been 
a more natural way of referring to the philosopher.29 Instead, Kant’s imperative addresses the 
reader. The reader of the Second Critique might be an academic philosopher, but she might 
also be someone who reads this book in order to learn about the guidelines and means of 
moral education. After all, these means are discussed in the Second Critique’s Doctrine of 
Method.30 
According to Kant, the ethicist sets up guidelines and foundations for education, but does not 
herself improve people’s dispositions. Popularizing philosophy and improving the general 
public based on philosophical doctrine is the role of popular philosophers, as well as teachers 
and private tutors, “popular instruction for children” (VI:14.8-10) and of religious authorities, 
religious instruction and preaching (VIII:403.5-10).31 P2 makes clear that, even though 
experiments affect moral education, they do so insofar as they are a philosophical method. 
According to P2, experiments are supposed to  
 
“prevent on the one hand the errors of a still crude, unpractised appraisal and on the other hand 
(what is far more necessary) the leaps of genius by which, as happens with the adepts of the 
philosopher’s stone, without any methodical study or knowledge of nature visionary treasures are 
promised and true ones are thrown away” (V:163.22-6). 
 
How can experiments prevent error and the leaps of supposed geniuses? Experiments help to 
establish a “doctrine of wisdom” (V:163.28), and this doctrine is supposed to “serve teachers 
as a guideline to prepare well and clearly the path to wisdom which everyone should travel, 
and to secure others against taking the wrong way” (V:163.29-31). Experiments are not 
supposed to educate directly, but to inform the educator, and thereby to indirectly improve 
education. They are a method of practical philosophy “and though the public need take no 
interest in [practical philosophy’s] subtle investigations it has to take an interest in the 
  
doctrines which, after being worked up in this way, can first be quite clear to it” (V:163.33-
5). 
According to Kant, any education has to rest on principles; and a moral education must rest 
on moral principles.32 Practical philosophy has to find these principles and thus to determine 
the guidelines of moral education. In its function as a foundation of moral education practical 
philosophy can indirectly influence an agent's “receptivity to a pure moral interest” 
(V:152.33-4), i.e., his capacity to take an interest in morality and to act on it, regardless of 
other considerations, and it can assist the “founding and cultivating of genuine moral 
dispositions“ (V:153.11). The ethicist finds or determines the guidelines of moral education. 
That is to say, he clarifies and systematizes the common agent’s tacit conception of morality 
and provides a philosophical justification for it. The educator is informed by these guidelines. 
The guidelines offer principles and a rational foundation for moral education. Ethical 
experiments indirectly influence moral education and the improvement of an agent’s 
disposition, insofar as they confirm the philosophical guidelines of moral education; in 
particular, as we will see, they confirm that Kant’s conceptual distinction between 
determining grounds resonates in ordinary deliberation (see sec.4.1), and that the authority of 
morality is not alien to common agents (see sec.4.2).  
The idea that the philosophical experiment primarily serves to obtain knowledge or to 
confirm scientific claims but can also have an educational function can be found in chemistry 
as well. While experiments in the natural sciences are primarily supposed to facilitate 
scientific research, some might also be used to illustrate a theory or to awaken curiosity. 
Certain philosophical thought experiments may be used as an illustration and to train the 
agent to clearly separate components of her thought so that she more clearly sees what duty 
demands (see for instance V:155.12-157.6, VI:480.15-483.8). The training or educational 
value of experiments, both in practical philosophy and chemistry, comes second to their value 
  
in discovering truth, though. 
That thought experiments for Kant are primarily concerned with philosophical truth not with 
an educational function becomes clear when paying attention to the location of the chemical 
passages in the Second Critique. P1 is located in a section called “Critical Elucidation of the 
Analytic of Pure Practical Reason”. This section is an “investigation and justification” 
(V:89.12-3) of why the preceding Analytic of Pure Practical Reason has the form it has, or it 
is a reflection on method. P2 is located in the very last paragraph of the Second Critique. This 
paragraph offers an overall summary of the Second Critique’s project. The location of both 
passages suggests that the chemical method plays an important role in the philosophical 
argument advanced in the Second Critique. P1 as part of a methodological reflection on the 
Analytic suggests that this role is particularly to be found in the Analytic, to which we will 
now turn.33 
 
4. Experiments in the Second Critique’s Analytic 
We will now discuss what the experiment specifically contributes to Kant’s philosophy by 
looking at the part of his practical philosophy that exhibits the experimental method at work 
most clearly: The Second Critique’s Analytic of Pure Practical Reason.  
Common human reason or common human understanding plays an important role as a point 
of reference for Kant’s enquiry throughout the Analytic. The commonest understanding can 
“see quite easily and without hesitation” (V:36.29) what is morally required in a specific 
situation (see also V:27.21-2), and Kant’s philosophical remarks are only supposed to “afford 
the judgement of common human reason somewhat greater distinctness” (V:36.7-8). The 
Analytic can be understood as an inquiry into the presuppositions and principles that enable a 
common, philosophically untutored rational agent to judge something as morally good or bad 
and to be motivated by these judgements. Kant’s goal in the Second Critique, much like his 
  
goal in the Groundwork, is to elaborate on insights revealed in ordinary judgements about 
matters of moral significance, to systematize these insights, and to defend them against 
corrupting moral theory.34 Experiments function as a method to confirm that Kant’s 
philosophical conception systematizes and defends notions that are indeed not alien to 
ordinary rational agents, and that his philosophy has a basis in how agents deliberate about 
morally relevant matters.  
The chemical decomposition and recombination that we find in the Second Critique’s 
Analytic is located in Remarks, which make up the bulk of the first twenty pages of the 
Analytic. These Remarks explain and discuss the main text’s Theorems and Problems. In so 
far as the experiments in the Remarks appear psychologically plausible to the reader they 
confirm Kant’s distinction between pure and empirical determining grounds of the will, as 
well as his claim that the will has a rational affinity to pure determining grounds, and that 
these determining grounds therefore come with an unconditional normative force.35 These are 
some of Kant’s main assumptions regarding morality and agency.  
Experiments do not introduce new distinctions or concepts. They show or confirm that Kant’s 
complex conceptual operations in the Analytic of the Second Critique start from and never 
lose contact with everyday moral evaluations. This methodological approach is already 
foreshadowed in a dense footnote in the Second Critique’s Preface (V:8) in which Kant 
stresses that his goal is not to invent a new principle of the good, but merely to find a new 
formula for a pre-existing notion of the morally good. 
We will now look at the decomposition (4.1) and recombination (4.2) described in the 
Analytic’s Remarks. 
  
4.1 The decomposition of common human reason 
Kant begins the Analytic in §1 with an analysis of practical principles. There are two different 
  
kinds of practical principles: maxims and practical laws. The former are only regarded as 
valid by the agent who adopted them, whereas the latter are valid for the will of every rational 
being (V:19.7-12). Maxims and practical laws are distinguished by the determining grounds 
they incorporate into a will (V:21.14-5). The distinction between determining grounds 
introduced in §1 corresponds to the distinction between the different determining grounds in 
an empirically affected will of an agent who recognises the moral law in P1. The Analytic’s 
distinction is, however, a conceptual one and not the result of a chemical decomposition of 
examples of reason judging morally. In the Remark to §1, Kant seemingly expresses doubt 
that practical laws exist, since they exist only under the assumption that there is a pure 
determining ground of the will. In order to confirm that practical laws exist, Kant suggests 
analysing the “pathological affected will of a rational being” (V:19.17), i.e., a will which 
resembles the one of the honest but tempted agent in P1. In this will we can find coexisting 
an empirical determining ground, namely, the maxim “to let no insult pass unavenged” 
(V:19.20-1) 36, as well as a pure determining ground.  
The aim of Kant’s analysis in the §1 Remark is to show that if we analyze how an ordinary 
rational agent goes about deliberating what she ought to do, we will find two very different 
kinds of determining grounds of her will. That they are different kinds of determining 
grounds is shown by the introspectively observable fact that they can be in “conflict” 
(V:19.18) with each other. Kant assumes that conflicts between determining grounds of the 
will require different kinds of determining grounds. One of these determining grounds is 
empirical, since the agent has adopted non-universalisable maxims, such as to let no insult 
pass unavenged. This implies that the other kind of determining ground is not empirical but 
something else. That we can easily construct a plausible scenario of a conflict in an agent’s 
will confirms Kant’s conceptual distinction between pure and empirical determining grounds 
as well as his assumption that there are pure determining grounds of the will.  
  
Kant’s analysis rests on a number of problematic assumptions. Firstly, he assumes that pure 
and empirical exhaust the possible classes of determining grounds and that a non-empirical 
determining ground hence is a pure one. Secondly, he assumes that different empirical 
determining grounds cannot be in a genuine conflict with each other. Only empirical and pure 
determining grounds can be in a real conflict. The reason behind this is presumably either that 
there is only one empirical determining ground, namely happiness, which encompasses the 
whole of an agent’s inclinations and desires (see V:25.24-27), or that if there is more than one 
empirical determining ground, the stronger trumps the weaker without a genuine conflict (see 
my sec.4.2). I will simply grant Kant his assumptions. 
In §1, the decomposition is supposed to confirm the problem Kant poses, namely that the will 
of finite rational agents can be determined by different kinds of determining grounds. Can the 
chemical method also give a hint as to what “affinities” the will of such an agent has? 
 
4.2 Recombination of determining grounds 
In the sections following §1, Kant discusses the two different kinds of determining grounds 
of the will in isolation from each other. The recombination of the isolated components is 
described in an example discussed in the Remark to §6. This again is an example of a 
pathologically affected will judging about morally significant matters.  
In the Remark, Kant discusses two thought experiments, which are supposed to show that 
even “experience confirms” (V:30.21) the epistemic priority of the moral law over freedom: 
 
“But experience also confirms this order of concepts in us. Suppose someone asserts of his lustful 
inclination that, when the desired object and the opportunity are present, it is quite irresistible to 
him; ask him whether, if a gallows were erected in front of the house where he finds this 
opportunity and he would be hanged on it immediately after gratifying his lust, he would not then 
control his inclination. One need not conjecture very long what he would reply. But ask him 
whether, if his prince demanded, on pain of the same immediate execution, that he give false 
  
testimony against an honorable man whom the prince would like to destroy under a plausible 
pretext, he would consider it possible to overcome his love of life, however great it may be. He 
would perhaps not venture to assert whether he would do it or not, but he must admit without 
hesitation that it would be possible for him. He judges, therefore, that he can do something because 
he is aware that he ought to do it and cognizes freedom within him, which, without the moral law, 
would have remained unknown to him.” (V:30.21-35) 
 
The first thought experiment deals with an empirical determining ground only. The empirical 
determining ground is simply measured in strength, and motivational force springing from 
this determining ground can be outweighed by stronger motivations springing from the same 
determining ground. An agent can easily change his mind if the expected pleasure-pain-
balance of an intended action changes. Genuine conflict within an agent’s deliberation can 
only be explained when assuming different kinds of determining grounds (see also IV:420.5-
8).  
In the second thought experiment, Kant introduces a determining ground of a different kind, a 
pure determining ground. Whether or not an agent would succumb to the prince’s threat, the 
agent “will perhaps not venture to assert” (V:30.32). It is unclear even to the agent himself 
how he would in fact act in a situation that comes with the threat of real losses. He might be 
weak and prefer life over duty. It is clear to the agent, however, how he ought to resolve the 
conflict between the two determining grounds: He should decide against all of his 
inclinations and obey the moral law, and the agent will judge “without hesitation” (V:30.32) 
that it is possible to do so. His judgement reveals that he is aware that he can do something, 
because he is aware of what he ought to do in this situation. Kant is not interested in how an 
agent predicts that he would in fact act in the situation described, but interested in what an 
agent would “admit” (V:30.33) to the philosopher, when experiencing the special force of the 
moral law, or when moral considerations become salient to an agent in the face of 
adversities.37 
  
After inquiring into the determining grounds that figure in the deliberation of finite agents in 
§1-6, Kant arrives at the conclusion that a distinction between how agents will de facto act 
and how they ought to is necessary when recombining components and investigating their 
affinities: The second thought experiment shows that at least on the level of what an agent on 
reflection admits a will has stronger affinities to pure than to empirical determining grounds. 
Kant’s idea is that if his reader can identify with the way the person in the second gallows 
scenario reacts, a deep and lasting affinity between the will and duty is confirmed; an affinity 
built into the nature of these things, as chemical affinities are built into chemical elements. In 
fact, Kant even suggests that the reader, if in doubt about the accuracy of how Kant describes 
the reaction of the person in the thought experiment, can present the case to a third party 
(“But ask him…”, i.e., someone who is neither Kant nor his reader – V:30.27, my emphasis) 
and learn something from this third party’s verdict.  
This specifically third-personal element of the gallows experiment is reflected in Kant’s 
claim that the Fact of Reason is  
 
“undeniable. One need only analyse the judgement that people pass on the lawfulness of their 
actions in order to find that, whatever inclinations may say to the contrary, their reason, 
incorruptible and self-constrained, always holds the maxim of the will in an action up to the pure 
will” (V:32.2-7). 
 
Kant assumes that it is other people’s judgments (“their reason”) that warrant the existence of 
the Fact. The Fact of Reason becomes undeniable when analyzing judgments of people 
[Menschen, plural]. The gallows case is the best example Kant presents of how we can get 
other people to judge such that the Fact of Reason becomes undeniable in the analysis of their 
judgments.38 
The main idea of Kant’s Second Critique, the claim that pure practical reason can be practical 
on its own, is thus shown to be in line with Kant’s general methodological assumption that 
  
practical philosophy cannot be a radical revision of the way common people deliberate and 
judge. Experiments in ethics make explicit structures that govern moral reasoning, just as the 
experimental chemist makes explicit the fundamental laws that govern parts of nature so 
small that it takes the artificial setup of experiments to make these laws observable. The 
experiment Kant suggests in the Second Critique’s §6 is supposed to confirm that no matter 
how much an agent is entangled in empirical determining grounds, insofar as she is rational 
she can recognize that pure determining grounds have authority over her. This reveals a 
significant difference between experiments in chemistry and in practical philosophy. The 
experiment in §6 does nothing to answer the question of how the agent who has to chose 
between life and obedience to the moral law will behave in fact. The answer to this question 
is simply contingent, and not the object of practical philosophy.  
Experiments in chemistry and ethics both enquire into laws. Experiments in practical 
philosophy investigate the law of an agent’s rational self in its relation to her sensuous nature. 
Rational laws come for a finite rational being as imperatives or unconditional oughts. Kant’s 
ethical experiments emphasize the normativity of moral commands by making explicit the 
difference between how an agent is uncertain about how he would act in a real situation, and 
how he acknowledges that he ought to act. Making explicit the distinction between matters of 
fact and what ought to be is a specific feature of experiments in ethics as conducted on the 
will of finite rational agents, and has no equivalent in chemistry. 
 
Conclusion 
What have we gained from my discussion of experiments in Kant’s ethics? The experiment as 
presented in P1 reveals that, according to Kant, the rational will and personal happiness start 
ethical deliberation in a solution with each other. An agent’s desire for happiness is the 
natural starting point of ethical deliberation, and this desire only loses its rational support 
  
(though not its affective force) when moral prohibitions become salient to an agent. 
Furthermore, P1 reveals that Kant thought that it can take other agents (chemists in his 
analogy) to bring certain moral prohibitions to our attention. This also entails that the 
philosopher (the chemist) has to actively create scenarios and confront agents with these 
cases, if she wants to obtain confirmation of her theory. Our discussion of P2 revealed that 
Kant, in his Second Critique, was engaged both in philosophical investigation and in 
providing the moral educator with material and advice to work with, and that Kant saw a 
close continuity between ethical theory and moral education.  
Most importantly, experiments are a strategy to trigger and investigate agent’s judgements 
about hypothetical scenarios of moral significance. The decomposition is supposed to reveal 
what ordinary judgements presuppose. Kant believes that agents even without any 
philosophical background when presented with the right scenario will confirm that the 
Second Critique’s Analytic deals with a problem that they can find in their moral 
deliberation, namely, that there are different kinds of determining grounds. The 
recombination is supposed to show which determining ground is accorded normative 
authority. If agents can identify with the person in the gallows case, or in other scenarios of 
agents abstracting from their inclinations in cases of conflict with morality, they confirm 
Kant’s central assumption that the will of rational agents has an affinity to the pure 
determining ground and that rational agents believe that they can do something because they 
ought to. They confirm that Kant’s assumption is not a perplexing notion of academic theory 
but the central element of what rational agents independently of moral theory take the status 
of morality to be.   
To close on a critical note: At least one important question remains unanswered by my 
discussion. Experiments are commonly seen as an impure element of scientific theory or one 
that requires room for empirical knowledge – after all, this is the kind of knowledge that 
  
experiments usually afford.39 It is clear that the ethical thought experiment does not deliver 
straightforwardly empirical knowledge about the mere behaviour of agents. Ethical 
experiments enquiry into reflected and considered responses to morally relevant cases and 
they are hence not empirical in the sense that facts about brain functions, psychology, or even 
human nature might be. Yet, there is a worry that experiments as recommended for the 
ethicist make Kant’s ethical theory, or at least its confirmation, dependent on knowledge 
about contingent subject-matters. Whether or not this is a problem Kant can deal with 
depends on how to best spell out his notion of purity and whether this notion allows for 
normative input from other agents for the philosopher’s theorizing.  
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